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Introduction 
Prior to sending US troops into Kosovo to protect the civilian population from Serbian 
aggression, then President Clinton carefully considered the possible consequences of deploying 
the military in such a volatile region.  Would Serbia retaliate against the US-led NATO troops, 
perhaps precipitating another European war?  How many American lives would be lost before 
the belligerents reached a settlement?  Would Serbia eventually concede to US demands or 
would the US and its allies eventually withdraw without achieving their objectives?  The US 
decision, in other words, was predicated on a careful consideration of the probable duration, the 
likely outcome, and the expected costs of the engagement.  Despite this important and 
straightforward link between the expected consequences of using force and the decision to use 
force, it is surprising how very little we know about the consequences of war.
1 If we concede that 
the expected costs, duration, and outcome of war are an important component of the decision to 
use force, it is particularly problematic that we have spent so much time studying war onset 
without first addressing questions related to the duration and outcomes of war.  
In this article, we have two purposes.  First, we want to improve our understanding of the 
neglected area of war consequences.  Questions related to war duration and war outcome are 
important in their own right and deserve greater attention.  Second, we want to extend our 
understanding of war onset by explicitly incorporating a richer and more detailed assessment of 
the probable consequences of war.  We do so by developing a model of war that incorporates the 
decision to begin a war as well as the decision to end it. 
                                                 
1 Scholars have recently recognized this deficit and begun to fill the void. Recent pieces 
include Bennett and Stam (1998), Reiter and Stam (1998), Smith (1998), Werner (1998), Stam 
(1999), Goemans (2000), and Wagner (2000). 3 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we informally present and then critique the 
common model of war that depicts war as a costly lottery between decisively winning and 
decisively losing the war. We argue that this “Fight to the Finish” model not only provides a 
poor foundation upon which to understand the onset of war, but it also fails to provide a useful 
point of departure to address the great variety of types of war observed empirically. Second, we 
present a model of war that allows the disputants to negotiate even after the war has begun and 
thus allows for much greater variation in how and when wars end. Third, we present the results 
of the model. The model not only identifies the conditions that increase the likelihood of war 
onset but those that impact the likely duration and outcome of war as well. Finally, we present 
the results of a simulation that help to clarify some of the comparative static results. 
While the individual results of the model are important, we maintain that the model 
makes a broader contribution to our understanding of international conflict.  First, the model 
represents a unified theory of war onset and war termination.  We agree strongly with Blainey 
(1988) and Wagner (2000) that the onset and termination of war are linked.  To understand 
either, we must understand both. By modeling not only the start of war but its termination as 
well, we take an important step towards a holistic theory of war. Second, the model challenges 
the common depiction of war as an alternative to politics. We maintain that war is an extension 
of politics (Clausewitz 1976); politicians use force not to supplant their diplomatic efforts but to 
support them.  By incorporating negotiation opportunities as well as battles into the model, we 
allow diplomacy to continue throughout the war.  
War: An Alternative to or an Extension of Politics? 
Although the consequences of war have generally been ignored as a specific area of 
study, in order to develop models of war onset scholars have been forced to make several 4 
assumptions, either implicitly or explicitly, about those consequences.  In models of crisis 
bargaining in which the key question of interest is whether or not the crisis will end peacefully, 
the outcome “war” is frequently depicted as a fight to the finish with the victor receiving all of 
the spoils (Morrow 1989, Powell 1990, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, Fearon 1994).
2 
Powell (1999:45) states this quite clearly:  “To simplify the analysis, we will assume that war 
can end in only one of two possible outcomes. Either S1 prevails by conquering S2 and 
eliminating it as a military power, or S2 prevails by eliminating S1.”  
This “fight to the finish” model of war has several limitations. Most obviously, its 
simplicity ensures that it provides a poor foundation upon which to study questions related to 
war outcomes.  The model presumes that force and diplomacy are substitutes for each other. If 
the politicians and diplomats are unable to reach a negotiated settlement, then they resort to force 
to seize by military means that which they could not acquire at the negotiating table.  This stark 
distinction between force and diplomacy, however, seems untenable.  Very few wars end with 
the total defeat of one side.  Instead, the vast majority of wars end even though both sides are 
still capable of fighting.  The war ends before one side is vanquished because the belligerents 
successfully negotiate a compromise settlement—clear evidence that diplomacy continues even 
after the fighting has begun.  A model that excludes a priori any possibility that wars end short of 
a decisive military victory obviously cannot explain why and when wars end in less extreme 
outcomes.  
                                                 
2 In some instances, war is similarly depicted as a costly lottery but the lottery is 
interpreted as the disputants’ prewar expectations about the final terms of settlement. As Wagner 
(2000) notes, such a representation of war reveals little because no explanation for those 
expectations is provided.  5 
The fight to the finish model not only limits our ability to understand the consequences of 
war, but it may also impede our analysis of war onset.  As Wagner (2000) explains, if war ends 
only when one side is vanquished, then war is an extremely costly gamble. Even in the best-case 
scenario where the leader ultimately wins, she must pay the significant cost of destroying her 
enemy.  The expectation of such costs likely creates an artificially high barrier to the use of 
force. If the war can end short of such devastation, then the costs of using force would be much 
lower. Expectations about the duration of the conflict would drive expectations about the costs of 
force. If the conflict was expected to be short, perhaps so short that it would likely end even 
before a “war” as war is commonly understood developed, then the expected costs of using force 
would presumably be much lower as well. If true, then leaders may be much more willing to 
resort to force than typically envisioned because the barriers to using force are not as high as 
often presumed. Failure to consider how expectations about the costs of using force vary thus 
may compromise our understanding about when leaders are likely to resort to force.  
In order to provide a better foundation to answer questions related to both war outcomes 
and war onset, it is necessary to develop a model of war that allows the disputants not only to 
negotiate a settlement to avoid a war, but to negotiate a settlement to terminate the war as well.  
To this end, we develop a richer, although admittedly still simplistic, model of war that includes 
the important possibility that the politicians can end the dispute by negotiating a settlement.  In 
the “bargaining and war” model developed below, the onset of war no longer signals the end of 
diplomacy but a continuation of it (Clausewitz 1976). 
The Bargaining and War Model 
The “fight to the finish” model is commonly adopted because of its simplicity.  War is an 
extremely complicated process and some simplifying assumptions are obviously necessary. We 6 
maintain, however, that a model of war at a minimum must incorporate not only military 
maneuverings but political machinations as well. We thus include in this model the possibility 
for the disputants to negotiate a settlement both before and after fighting has begun. 
Incorporating the possibility of diplomacy in war, however, raises a fundamental puzzle. If the 
belligerents need not secure a decisive military victory to end the war but can instead terminate 
the war by negotiating a settlement, why would they be able to reach such an agreement after the 
fighting has begun if they were unable to do so at an earlier time so as to prevent the conflict in 
the first place (Fearon 1995, Wagner 2000)? To address this puzzle, we include uncertainty in 
the model (Fearon 1995).  While negotiations may initially fail because the disputants cannot 
agree on the terms of settlement, they may eventually succeed as the disputants learn about what 
concessions each side is willing to make.  
Although we believe that the possibility of continued diplomacy is fundamental to a 
model of war, it is also critical to recognize that these negotiations take place against the 
backdrop of military engagement. We include the military component of the war in the model in 
two important ways. First, the fighting ensures that failing to reach an agreement is costly.  The 
more time it takes to reach a settlement, the more resources are expended in the war effort. 
Second, the fact that fighting continues even as the belligerents negotiate also raises the 
possibility that the war might end, not in a settlement negotiated by both belligerents, but in a 
decisive military victory.  In this case, rather than negotiating a settlement, the victor can impose 
a settlement on an enemy incapable of further resistance and thus bereft of any bargaining 
leverage. This possibility creates a risk for both belligerents that shadows any negotiations.  
The model has one attacker A and one defender D.  Initially, A has benefits BA and D has  
benefits Bd. Assume that  a B  and  d B  are completely divisible (for an analysis with non-divisible 7 
benefits see Filson and Werner 2000). In addition to his/her benefits, each player also has some 
military resources. A has resources  a R and D has resources  d R .  Each player’s objective is to 
obtain as many benefits as possible while conserving resources.  
Initially, A’s utility is  ) , ( a a a B R U  and D’s utility is  ) , ( d d d B R U . Assume that each utility 








These assumptions imply that each player always wants more resources and more benefits, that 
the marginal utilities of resources and benefits are diminishing, and that the marginal utility of 
benefits is increasing in resources and the marginal utility of resources is increasing in benefits. 
This last condition implies that a disputant’s willingness to risk resources in battle is increasing 
in his amount of resources and decreasing in the size of his benefits. 
A war consists of an alternating sequence of negotiations and battles. If negotiations 
succeed, the war ends.  If negotiations fail, the disputants fight another battle. In each battle, D 
defeats A with probability d and loses with probability  d − 1 . When the disputants fight they 
expend resources. The amount of resources lost depends on who wins each battle.  Denote the 
amount of resources available to A if she wins the first battle by 
w
a R , and the amount available if 
she loses by 
l




a R R > . Similarly, 
w
d R and 
l
d R describe the resources available to D after 
winning or losing the first battle. To keep track of multiple wins and losses while allowing the 
remaining resources to depend on the order of wins and losses we add superscripts as battles are 
fought.  For example, 
wl
a R represents A’s resources after she wins the first battle and loses the 
second. The model imposes no a priori restrictions on the resource losses that occur during 
fighting other than that a loss is worse than a win.  The resources that remain after a series of 
battles can depend on the initial resources, the order of wins and losses, or anything else that may 8 
be relevant. Since empirically resource losses differ across battles and wars, this generality is 
useful for constructing falsifiable hypotheses about the onset, duration, and outcomes of war. 
While the disputants value resources directly, they are also important because they enable 
them to continue fighting.  We incorporate the possibility of a decisive military victory into the 
game by assuming that the disputants must maintain some minimal amount of resources to 
continue fighting.  The war ends as soon as one side’s resources fall below the minimal amount 
of resources necessary to continue fighting.  If both sides’ resources are below the minimal 
amount then the status quo is restored.  The bargaining and war game thus may be long, but it 
cannot be infinite.  We assume that if one side is decisively defeated, she relinquishes all claims 
to her benefits.   The disputants’ initial resources and the amounts of resources lost with each 
battle determine the maximum possible duration of the war.   
Although in real wars the disputants may be uncertain about of variety of factors, we 
introduce uncertainty into the model in a simple way in order to obtain precise results.  First, we 
assume that the uncertainty is one-sided; D has complete information about A, but A does not 
have complete information about D. Although it is surely heroic to assume that D is completely 
informed about A, a large variety of equilibria exist in bargaining games with two-sided 
incomplete information, making prediction difficult or impossible.
3 In contrast, the bargaining 
game we describe has a unique equilibrium. Second, we assume that A’s uncertainty about D is 
confined to uncertainty about D’s military ability d (the probability that D wins each battle). All 
types of D are assumed to have the same utility function  (.,.) d U ; they differ only by their 
military ability d. The value of d is known to D, but not to A. 
                                                 
3 Fudenberg and Tirole (1992) discuss the complications that arise in dynamic games 
with two-sided uncertainty. 9 
In general, war in this game can last for any number of battles, but we begin by 
presenting a simple example in which several assumptions limit the duration of war. The simple 
example is sufficient to obtain much of the intuition about the main forces affecting the onset, 
duration, and outcomes of war.  Following the analysis of this example, we present results from 
more general examples using simulation methods.  In the simple example, we make the 
following assumptions: 
Assumption 1: A can only sustain one battle loss before her resources are insufficient to 
continue fighting and she must forfeit her benefits. This implies that a second battle can occur 
only if A wins the first battle.  
Assumption 2: D can only sustain two battle losses before his resources are insufficient to 
continue fighting. This assumption along with the first implies that if a second battle occurs, it is 
decisive.   
Assumption 3: There are only two types of D. One has  h d d =  and the other has  l d d = , where 
l h d d > . 
These simplifying assumptions limit the extensive form of the game to that described in 
Figures 1-3. Figure 1 sets up the environment and describes stage 1, the choices leading up to the 
first battle. Initially, A is uncertain about D’s type and believes that D is type  h d  with probability 
1 λ  and type  l d  with probability  1 1 λ − . She either proposes that D give up a share of her benefits, 
d B 1 γ , or not. If she makes no proposal war does not start and the game ends; A‘s utility is 
) , ( a a a B R U and D’s is  ) , ( d d d B R U . If she makes a proposal then each type of D either accepts it 
or rejects it. If D accepts, she gives  d B 1 γ  to A and the game ends; A’s utility is 
) , ( 1 d a a a B B R U γ + and D’s utility is  ) ) 1 ( , ( 1 d d d B B U γ − . If D rejects, then A updates her belief that 10 
D is type  h d to probability 2 λ (updating is described further below) and either attacks or quits.  If 
she quits, the status quo is maintained and the outcome is the same as if A does not ask for  d B . If 
A attacks, then Nature determines who wins the first battle.  As described above, A wins with 
probability  d − 1  and loses with probability d . If A loses, then given the above assumptions, she 
is decisively defeated and must forfeit her benefits to D.  
Figure 2 describes stage 2, the choices if A wins the first battle. After observing the battle 
outcome A updates her beliefs that D is type  h d to probability 3 λ . A then proposes that D give up 
d B 2 γ . D faces a situation just like the first stage – he either accepts or rejects the proposal. If D 
rejects, then A updates her belief that D is type  h d  to probability 4 λ and either attacks or retreats. 
The game differs between stages 1 and 2 only because A’s beliefs are different, both players have 
suffered some loss of resources from the first battle, and A’s “quit” option is now an option to 
retreat. Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that the second battle is decisive with the winner receiving 
all of the benefits.  
Figure 3 describes stage 3, the choices if A retreats after winning the first battle. If A 
retreats then D becomes the aggressor: A offers to give up a share of her benefits,  a B ) 1 ( 3 γ − , and 
D either accepts or rejects. If D accepts, he takes  a B ) 1 ( 3 γ − and the game ends. If he rejects, he 
attacks. If D attacks then a battle occurs as above; the only difference is that now the players 
fight over A’s benefits. The battle that occurs is decisive: if A wins then D quits and if D wins 
then A gives up her benefits. If D quits, the players each end up with their initial benefits; the 
only effect of war is that both players have suffered some loss in resources. 
The simplest interpretation of the game is that it is a turf war. At the beginning, A can ask 
for some part of D’s turf, and D can either surrender it to A or not. If A attacks then A and D fight 11 
over D’s turf. If A retreats, then D can choose to carry the fight over to A’s turf; the two parties 
switch roles and D becomes the aggressor. Thus, starting a war is risky for A both because she 
might lose resources without gaining any of D’s territory and because she might end up giving 
up some of her territory to D.  
Results 
In the following subsections, we present several results from the bargaining and war 
game.
 4 The equilibrium concept is a refined version of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). 
The PBE requires that both types of D play optimally, that A’s beliefs are determined using 
Baye’s rule whenever possible, and that A’s choices are optimal given her beliefs.
5  We refine the 
PBE equilibrium in order to eliminate unrealistic off-the-path beliefs (see Fudenberg and Tirole 
1992, Mas-Colell et al. 1995).  We require that if A believes that type  l d refuses with positive 
probability in a stage then A must also believe that type  h d refuses with probability 1 in that 
stage. This puts a lower bound on  2 λ ,  3 λ , and  4 λ  and rules out some perverse PBEs. 
War Onset 
We begin by identifying the conditions necessary for a war to begin.  In the model, three 
things must happen for war to begin: A must make a proposal, D must reject it, and A must attack 
D upon rejection.  If any of these things does not happen, war is avoided. For a war to continue 
                                                 
4 Due to space concerns, we do not fully characterize the equilibrium.  The full 
characterization is available from the authors upon request. 
5 We restrict our attention to pure-strategy equilibria wherever possible. As a result, the 
equilibrium strategies are unique, though in cases where both types of D agree, a range of beliefs 
can support A’s equilibrium strategy.   12 
past the first battle, similar conditions must again be met: D must again reject A’s proposal and A 
must again attack after rejection. Results 1 and 2 establish that A’s threat to attack must be 
credible in order for war to start.  
Result 1: If A prefers to retreat rather than attack when  3 4 λ λ = , then in equilibrium both types 
of defenders always reject any proposal in the second stage.  Similarly, if A prefers to quit rather 
than attack when  1 2 λ λ = , then in equilibrium both types of defenders always reject any proposal 
in the first stage. If both types of D reject any proposal, then it does not matter what A proposes. 
Proof: D’s payoff when A retreats is always at least  ) , ( d
l
d d B R U . Therefore, if A prefers retreat to 
attack when  3 4 λ λ = , then both types optimally refuse to give up any  d B .  Likewise, D’s payoff 
when A quits is  ) , ( d d d B R U . Therefore, if A prefers to quit rather than attack when her demand is 
refused and  2 λ λ = , then both types optimally refuse to give up any  d B . QED 
Result 2: If in equilibrium A attacks in stage 1, then if she wins the first battle she is willing to 
attack in stage 2: A never retreats after winning the first battle. Thus, if A is unwilling to attack in 
stage 2, then war never starts. 
Proof: If A attacks in stage 1 then it must be the case that her expected utility from attacking 
exceeds ) , ( a a a B R U . If she retreats with probability 1 after winning the first battle then the best 
possible outcome for A is that D is unwilling to attack her. In this case, she ends up with 
) , ( a
w
a a B R U , which is strictly less than  ) , ( a a a B R U . When combined with the assumption that if 
A loses the first battle, she retreats and gives up, A’s highest possible expected payoff from 




a a B R U d R U d − + , where  l h d d d ) 1 ( 1 1 1 λ λ − + = .  For all 
values of  1 d , this payoff is strictly less than A’s initial payoff  ) , ( a a a B R U . Therefore, it is never a 13 
best response for A to attack in stage 1 if she knows that she will retreat with probability 1 after 
winning. QED 
The intuition behind these results is straightforward.  A’s proposal is shadowed by the 
threat to use force if D does not concede. If A is unwilling to attack, then D has no incentive to 
make any concessions. What A proposes at that point is immaterial.  All proposals are rejected. 
While these results are intuitive and follow in a straightforward fashion from the logic of 
backwards induction, three implications are particularly interesting. 
First, since A has the ability to quit or retreat after she learns that D has refused her 
demand, A’s threat to attack must be credible not only when the negotiations begin but after 
negotiations fail as well.  This may be a difficult hurdle for A to overcome.  Each time 
negotiations fail because D rejects, A becomes increasingly pessimistic about the type of 
defender she faces and thus about her chances in future battles. According to Baye’s Rule, if A’s 
demand is refused by D, then A updates her beliefs that  h d d = as 
follows:

















, where r equals the probability that 
h d refuses and q equals the probability that  l d refuses. Since  l h d d > , type  l d is willing to make 




t γ γ ≤ , where 
h
t γ and 
l
t γ denote 
the highest value of γ in stage tthat is acceptable to type  h d and  l d , respectively.
6 Since 
                                                 
6 Note that it is possible that there are no values of 
h
1 γ or 
h
2 γ that are acceptable to type 
h d .  Similarly, it is possible that there are no values of 
l
1 γ or 
l
2 γ that are acceptable to type  l d . If 
) ( d a h B B d + and ) ( d a l B B d + exceed  d B by enough then even  0 1 = γ and 0 2 = γ may be 14 
h d refuses any demand greater than 
h
t γ while  l d refuses any demand greater than 
l
t γ , it must also 
be true that  r q ≤ . Since strong defenders are always at least as likely as weak defenders to 
refuse a settlement, then the weakest defenders tend to be “screened out” as they accept 
negotiated settlements. This leaves only the stronger defenders as fighting continues.
7   
If A is willing to attack even when she is certain that the defender is the strong type 
( 1 = λ ), then she maintains a credible threat to attack even if negotiations fail.  A may be less 
optimistic about her chances, but she is still willing to fight the next battle. However, if A is 
willing to attack when  1 λ λ = or when  3 λ λ = but prefers to retreat when 1 = λ , then there may be 
no pure-strategy equilibrium.  If A were to make an offer just acceptable to the weak defender, 
then the weak defender would accept and the strong defender would reject. If negotiations then 
failed, A would know for certain that the defender must be the strong type.  Knowing this, A 
would rather quit/retreat than attack. Anticipating A’s turn-around if negotiations fail, the weak 
defender would mimic the strong defender and reject the demand. In this situation, only a mixed 
                                                                                                                                                       
unacceptable—both types would rather fight. If 
h γ and 








t γ γ . 
7 This dynamic may suggest that the outcome of the war and the duration of the war are 
linked. Holding other factors constant, attackers become less likely to win a decisive military 
victory as the war progresses since it becomes more likely that they are facing strong defenders.  
We know empirically that more often than not, the initiating or attacking state tends to win wars 
(Wang and Ray 1994, Gartner and Siverson 1996, Reiter and Stam 1999, Stam 1999).  The 
model suggests that when initiators do lose, the war that led to their demise was likely a long 
one. 15 
strategy equilibrium is possible: A attacks with probability t p and type  l d rejects with probability 
t q .
8  Since the weaker defender sometimes rejects A’s demand, A is unable to update her beliefs 
about D’s type to certainty.  If her proposal is rejected, A becomes more pessimistic about her 
chances but not so much that she is unwilling to follow through on her threat to attack. This 
implies that since A must maintain a credible threat to attack for a war to start, one of two things 
is likely true when wars begin: either the attacker is willing to fight even in the worst case 
scenario that the defender is very strong or the attacker is initially so confident that the defender 
is weak that some bad news is not sufficient to dissuade her from attacking.   
The second implication follows from Result 2.  Result 2 shows that for A to be willing to 
fight the first battle, she must also be willing to fight the last battle as well. If A anticipates that 
she will eventually retreat, the game unravels. A anticipates that if she fights in the first stage 
then the negotiations that follow will fail and she will be forced to retreat. Rather than pay the 
costs of fighting in the first stage simply to retreat when negotiations inevitably fail, she retreats 
immediately.  A’s unwillingness to fight to the end prevents her from credibly threatening to 
attack initially.  
In more complex examples in which A might sustain several losses before conceding her 
benefits, A need not be willing to fight every battle in order to credibly threaten to attack 
initially, but she does need to be willing to fight to the end at least when the tide of battle is in 
her favor. Just as D’s response to her demands provides A with information so too do battle 
                                                 
8 It turns out that in the mixed strategy equilibrium only type dl uses a mixed strategy. 
Type dl’s probability of rejecting ensures that when A updates her beliefs she is indifferent 
between attacking and retreating, but in equilibrium A attacks with probability 1.  Details are 
available from the authors upon request. 16 
outcomes.
9  According to Baye’s rule, A updates her beliefs that  h d d = as follows: 














. Since  l h d d > , then  3 λ  must be less than  2 λ : A’s victory makes 
her more optimistic about D’s type and thus more optimistic about the outcomes of future battles. 
Conversely, after each battle loss, A becomes less optimistic about D’s type and thereby less 
optimistic about the outcomes of future battles. If A anticipates that she will eventually retreat 
even in the best-case scenario where she is winning, than it is in her best interest not to fight at 
all. Since fighting is costly, limited probes are unlikely. Only if the attacker is losing are we 
likely to see her pulling back or retreating.   
The final implication deals with the relationship between force and diplomacy. Results 1 
and 2 show that the distinction frequently drawn between the use of force and diplomacy is a 
false one.  D only agrees to concede some of his benefits because he anticipates that if he does 
not, A will resort to force. If D anticipates that A will withdraw rather than attack, both types of 
D refuse to make any concessions and negotiations fail.  In this model the success of diplomacy 
rests on the credible threat of force.  
                                                 
9 The fact that the attacker learns not only from the defender’s response but the battle 
outcomes as well is an important and realistic component of the model.  Nothing was more 
revealing about the capacity of the Iraqi military—a key source of uncertainty in the Gulf War, 
for instance, than the actual failure of Iraq’s air defense systems, the repeated inaccuracy of her 
skud missile attacks, and the ease with which the allies’ launched their ground offensive. As the 
war was fought, the allies were able to revise their assessment of their opponent and to alter their 
negotiating stance accordingly.  The war itself provided the information that was previously 
lacking. 17 
Whether or not A is willing to fight each battle is clearly central to whether or not a war 
begins. What conditions must be satisfied for A to be willing to attack? Results 3 and 4 identify 
the conditions that make it more likely that A will attack if negotiations fail. 
Result 3:  If there is no proposal that is acceptable to type  l d then A is unwilling to attack.
10 
Thus, if A anticipates that she will have to fight regardless of what proposal she makes, then the 
war never starts.  
Proof: We prove this for stage 2.  A similar logic applies in stage 1. If there is no proposal that is 
acceptable to type  l d in stage 2, then in stage 1 when A is deciding whether to attack she knows 
that she obtains  d a B B + if she wins two battles and loses  a B otherwise. Her probability of 
obtaining  d a B B + is ) 1 )( 1 ( 3 2 d d − − , where  l h d d d ) 1 ( 2 2 2 λ λ − + = and  l h d d d ) 1 ( 3 3 3 λ λ − + = , 
where  3 λ is defined above. Substitute for  3 λ and simplify to show that 




3 2 λ λ − − + − = − − l h d d d d , which must be strictly less than 
2 ) 1 ( l d − , which 
must be strictly less than  ) 1 ( l d − . Now if there is no proposal that is acceptable to type  l d , then 
it must be the case that  ) ( d a l d B B d B + < which implies that  ) )( 1 ( d a l a B B d B + − > . Thus, given 
that  l d d d − < − − 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( 3 2 and given that A’s utility function is concave, A is strictly better off 
with  a B then she is with a lottery that pays  d a B B + with probability  ) 1 )( 1 ( 3 2 d d − − and 0 
otherwise.  A does not sacrifice resources to obtain expected benefits that are lower than her 
initial benefits. QED 
                                                 
10 There may be no proposal acceptable to  l d if his expected gain from fighting is high 
enough (see footnote 5). 18 
Result 3 suggests an important relationship between the possibility of war and whether or 
not there is a disparity between the players’ distribution of power and their distribution of 
benefits (Powell 1999, Werner 1999).  D’s unwillingness to concede and commitment to fighting 
arises directly from a gap between what he has and what he thinks he can get. D is willing to 
refuse all demands only if  ) ( d a l d B B d B + < . Rearranging terms shows that it is only possible for 







, or D’s proportion of the available benefits is 
less than his probability of victory.
11  If d generally indicates the distribution of power between 
the disputants, then D’s willingness to fight is driven by a disparity between the distribution of 
power and the distribution of benefits:  D refuses to make any concessions because what he 
currently has is already less than what he thinks he deserves given his power relative to A. If D 
has less than he deserves given his power, this implies that A must have more than she 









.  Since A is advantaged by the status quo, A is better off laying 
low, keeping her current benefits of  a B and not challenging D.  
Reversing the situation provides conditions ripe for an assault by A. If the status quo 
favors D such that D’s share of the benefits exceeds his share of power, then D does not expect 
that he could successfully defend his current share of the benefits if a war were to start.  If 
challenged, he would be willing to make some concessions rather than fight a war he expects to 
                                                 
11 D is only potentially committed to battle under these conditions because it may be the 
case that his costs are sufficiently high that he is willing to make some concessions even though 
he does not expect to lose any territory if he were to fight. D cannot be committed to battle, 
however, if this condition is not fulfilled. 19 
lose (the amount he is willing to give up is discussed below). While D is advantaged by the 
status quo, A is disadvantaged. The discrepancy between the distributions of power and benefits 
creates a situation in which A believes that war would provide her a greater share of the benefits 
at stake.  War of course does not necessarily follow. Despite her dissatisfaction with the 
distribution of benefits, A may still be unwilling to fight because of the anticipated costs of 
battle.  The disputants may also avoid war if D is willing to make the concessions demanded by 
A. A’s dissatisfaction with the status quo, however, is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for 
war.  
This result addresses two long-standing debates in the discipline regarding the 
relationships between the possibility of conflict and the distribution of power and the possibility 
of conflict and the value of the status quo (see Powell 1999 and Werner 1999 for reviews).  If a 
discrepancy between the distributions of power and benefits creates a permissive condition for 
conflict, then the relationships between the probability of conflict, the distribution of power, and 
the value of the status quo are interconnected. A state may be willing to attack even if her 
probability of success is low if her share of the available benefits is even lower.  This may 
explain why some small states are sometimes willing to take on much larger adversaries. The 
degree to which there is a discrepancy between the distribution of power and the distribution of 
benefits also provides a useful way to define the elusive notion of state dissatisfaction (see also 
Powell 1999).  While dissatisfaction with the status quo has long been identified as a critical 
component of war, it has been difficult to determine either analytically or empirically which 
states are dissatisfied.
12  
                                                 
12 Power transition theorists, in particular, have focused productively on the importance 
of dissatisfaction to the risk of war (for a review see Kugler and Lemke 1996).   20 
 Result 4 identifies how different parameters affect whether or not A is willing to attack 
and thus affect the possibility of war. 
Result 4: If  d B is sufficiently high and A’s anticipated resource losses are sufficiently low, then 
in equilibrium A is willing to attack. If  d B is sufficiently low and A’s anticipated resource losses 
sufficiently high, then in equilibrium A retreats/quits. Further, if  l d is sufficiently high then A 
retreats/quits. A is more likely to be willing to attack if D’s anticipated resource losses are small.  
Proof: As long as A’s resources are not driven below the minimum necessary to fight a battle, as 
d B rises eventually the expected utility from attacking must exceed the expected utility from 
retreating/quitting because  (.,.) a U  is an increasing function. At the other extreme, if  d B is small 
and A’s anticipated resources losses sufficiently large then A prefers to retreat/quit. To determine 
the effect of  l d note that if  1 = l d then  h d must also equal 1, and in this case if A attacks in stage 1 
he gets  ) 0 , (
l
a a R U but if she quits she gets  ) , ( a a a B R U , which is strictly higher. This implies that if 
l d is sufficiently high then A prefers to quit.
13 To determine the effect of D’s anticipated resource 
losses note that if D’s anticipated losses fall then A’s payoff from retreating falls because 
h
3 γ and 
l
3 γ fall and her payoff from attacking does not change. QED 
These results show that what is at stake as well as the anticipated costs of war critically 
affect whether or not A can credibly threaten to attack.  Fighting each battle rather than quitting 
or retreating involves risk. If the potential benefits are great enough, then A is willing to attack 
                                                 
13 Similarly, in stage 2, if A attacks he gets  ) 0 , (
wl
a a R U but if she retreats he gets 
) , ( 3 a
h w
a a B R U γ , which is strictly higher. This implies that if  l d is sufficiently high then A prefers 
to retreat rather than attack in stage 2. 21 
even if the probability of winning is low. Similarly, if the anticipated costs of fighting are 
sufficiently low then A is willing to attack despite the risk involved. Perhaps surprisingly, D’s 
anticipated resource losses also influence A’s willingness to attack. Whereas it is commonplace 
to assert that the expectation of high costs acts as a deterrent to conflict, it is generally assumed 
that the disputant’s own costs are the critical factor.  Here, the defender’s anticipated costs also 
influence A’s willingness to fight because they impact what proposal is acceptable to D. The 
larger D’s anticipated costs, the more concessions D is willing to make and the less attractive 
attacking looks in comparison. The anticipated costs of conflict are important not only because 
they make fighting less attractive but because they can make the negotiated settlements more 
attractive as well. While Result 4 provides some intuition about the effects of the parameters on 
the onset, duration, and outcomes of war, it applies when parameters are either high or low. It is 
difficult to obtain general results on the effects of changing parameters for much of the 
intermediate ranges. The reason why is that when A is deciding whether to attack or retreat in 
stage 2, she compares the expected utility from attacking to the expected utility of retreating, and 
changing the parameter values tends to change A’s payoffs from attacking and retreating in the 
same direction. For example, as the probability that D wins a fight rises, D requires more 
benefits in order to agree in the retreat continuation and is more likely to win a battle if attacked.  
These effects cause A’s payoffs from attacking and retreating to both fall; the net impact on A’s 
decision to attack or retreat is not clear. Given the difficulties of obtaining precise analytical 
results, either an empirical analysis or a simulation must be used to sort out the comparative 
statics. We provide simulation results below. 22 
Conflict Termination  
While a war cannot start if A is unwilling to attack, A’s willingness to attack does not 
necessarily mean that a war will occur.  The disputants’ ability to negotiate a settlement provides 
the means to avoid the war even when A is ready to fight.  Likewise, if the disputants initially fail 
to reach a settlement and a war does begin, their ability to reach a negotiated settlement later 
provides the means to terminate the war. Wars terminate or are avoided when A makes a 
proposal that the defender accepts.  What proposals A makes thus determines when war ends.  
Recall that 
h
t γ and 
l
t γ denotes the highest values of  t γ acceptable to types  h d and  l d , 
respectively, in stage t. If 
h
t γ and 
l
t γ are well defined such that there are values of 
h
t γ and 
l
t γ that 
are acceptable to  h d and  l d , then the values of 
h
t γ are determined as follows.  In stage 3, 
h d accepts A’s proposal after A’s retreat if:  
 ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ) 1 ( , ( 3 d
ll
d d h d a
lw
d d h d a
l
d d B R U d B B R U d B B R U − + + ≥ + −γ .                   (1) 
In stage 2:  h d accepts A’s proposal after A wins the first battle if:  




d d h d
l
d d U p B B R U d R U d p B R U − + + + − ≥ −γ ,    (2) 
where  2 p denotes the probability A attacks and  3 dh U denotes  h d ’s continuation utility if A 
retreats. In stage 1,  h d accepts A’s proposal if: 
  ) , ( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) , ( [ ) ) 1 ( , ( 2 1 d d d dh h d a
w
d d h d d d B R U p U d B B R U d p B R U − + − + + ≥ −γ ,    (3) 
where  p denotes the probability A attacks and  2 dh U denotes  h d ’s continuation utility if A attacks 
and wins the battle. The values of 
l
t γ are determined similarly.  Simply replace  h d with  l d and 
dht U with  dlt U . 23 
Since  l h d d > ,  l d is willing to make a greater concession to A in order to avoid a fight 




t γ γ ≤ .  The inequality is strict unless both types are willing to give up all of 




t γ γ . This implies that (1) any proposal less than or equal to 
h
t γ is acceptable to both 
types, (2) any proposal greater than 
h
t γ but less than or equal to 
l
t γ is acceptable to type  l d but 
unacceptable to type  h d ; and (3) any proposal greater than 
l
t γ is unacceptable to both types.  
Since more benefits are better than less, A never asks for less than that with which she can get 
away.  As a result, there are at most three relevant options for A in each stage: propose 
h
t γ , 
propose 
l
t γ , or ask for more than 
l
t γ . The conflict ends as soon as A demands 
h
t γ , may either 
continue or end if A proposes 
l
t γ (depending upon whether the defender is type  l d or type  h d ), 
and definitely continues if A demands more than 
l
t γ .  
Results 5 and 6 identify the conditions for conflict termination by identifying the 
conditions under which A makes the different proposals. 
 Result 5: In equilibrium, A never provokes a fight with both types.  At each negotiating 
opportunity, if type  l d  remains then A prefers proposing 
l
t γ  to proposing any 
l
t t γ γ > . Similarly, 
if type  h d is the only type left, A prefers proposing 
h
t γ to proposing any 
h
t t γ γ > . 
Proof: We prove this for A’s decision in stage 3 (the subgame that occurs after A retreats).  
Proofs for A’s decisions in stages 1 and 2 are similar and are omitted. To see why A never 
provokes a fight with both types in equilibrium, first note that if  1 3 =
l γ so that type  l d is willing 
to allow A to retain all of  a B rather than fight, A is unable to provoke a fight.  If  1 3 <
l γ  then if A 
prefers proposing some 
l
3 3 γ γ > to proposing 
l
3 γ , then it must be the case that  24 






a a l B R U B R U d R U d γ ≥ − + . 
However, by Jensen’s inequality (which states that for concave functions  )) ( ( )) ( ( x U E x E U d d ≥ , 
where (.) E represents the expectation operation and xrepresents a random variable) and the fact 
that 
wl
a R and 
ll
a R are both less than 
w
a R ,  






a a l B d R U B R U d R U d − < − + , 
which, when combined with the fact that  l
l d < − ) 1 ( 3 γ (proven below in Result 7), implies that 






a a l B R U B R U d R U d γ < − + . Therefore, it cannot be the case that A prefers 
to propose some 
l
3 3 γ γ > . A similar argument establishes that 






a a h B R U B R U d R U d γ < − + . Since A always prefers the settlement to 
fighting type  h d for certain, then A proposes 
h
3 γ if type  h d is the only type left. QED 
Result 5 offers an important insight into the causes of war.  War does not occur because A 
is simply aggressive and doggedly committed to fighting.  A always makes a proposal that some 
type of defender will accept.  Wars occur in this model only when A gambles that the defender is 
the weak type and makes a proposal that only the weaker defender accepts. If the defender is the 
strong type, then he refuses and a war begins. Further, note that wars do not start because the 
defender is doggedly committed to fighting. D fights, not because he is unwilling to make any 
concessions but because he is unwilling to make as large a concession as A demands.
14 D fights 
because he prefers the risky battle outcome to A’s excessive demand.  War is a product of A’s 
willingness to endure the risk of fighting in order to obtain a better settlement and D’s 
                                                 
14 It is thus too simplistic to conclude that both sides must anticipate victory for a war to 
be rational (Blainey 1988).   25 
expectation that by fighting he can demonstrate that he deserves a better settlement than 
previously proposed.  
Result 6 highlights the conditions that make it more likely that A will risk starting or 
continuing a war by offering 
l
t γ rather than 
h
t γ .  
Result 6: A is more likely to propose 
l
t t γ γ = if she is optimistic that D is type  l d , if she 
anticipates low resource losses from fighting, and if  l d is low.  
Proof: We again prove this for A’s decision in stage 3.  Proofs for A’s decisions in stages 1 and 2 
are similar and are omitted. Given that A never demands 
l
t t γ γ > , A’s expected utility in the 
continuation following her retreat,  3 a U , can be expressed as follows: 
 
)} , ( )( 1 ( )] , ( )( 1 ( ) 0 , ( [













B R U B R U d R U d
B R U U
γ λ λ
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− + − +
=
                        (4) 
In the first branch, A proposes  a
hB 3 γ , both types accept, and a battle does not occur. In the second 
branch A proposes  a
lB 3 γ , type  l d accepts and type  h d refuses and fights. Expression 1 establishes 
that changing  4 λ , 
wl
a R , and 
ww
a R has no effect on 
h
3 γ and 
l
3 γ .  Given this, partial derivatives can be 
used to show that decreasing  4 λ , and increasing
wl
a R  and 
ww
a R increases the value in the second 
branch of expression 4 without changing the value in the first branch. Therefore, A will be more 
likely to propose 
l
3 γ if  4 λ and A’s anticipated resource losses are low. By expression 1, decreasing 
l d does not change 
h
3 γ but increases 
l
3 γ . Therefore, A will be more likely to propose 
l
3 γ if  l d is 
low. QED 
This result is intuitive once A’s settlement proposals are viewed in terms of a risk-return 
tradeoff.  Expression 4 demonstrates that A can either choose to get  a
hB 3 γ for certain or risk 26 
continuing the war in order to get the more favorable settlement of  a
lB 3 γ . Whether or not A 
chooses the safe, but less favorable, settlement option or the risky, but more favorable, settlement 
option depends upon how A assesses the value of the gamble. The more confident A is that the 
defender is the weak type, the less risky it seems to make a tough demand.  A less optimistic 
attacker is more cautious and is thus more likely to make moderate demands in order to reduce 
the possibility of war against the stronger defender. It is thus not surprising that many have noted 
that when wars do start, the attacker often seems very confident of victory (Blainey 1988).  A’s 
beliefs can change throughout the war, however, as she learns from both D’s responses and from 
battle outcomes.  Since A generally becomes more pessimistic each time negotiations fail, we 
should expect a general tendency for attackers to propose terms acceptable to the stronger 
defenders as the war continues: war becomes more likely to end the longer it has endured.
15 In 
addition, since battle victories make A more optimistic about the defender’s type while battle 
losses make her less optimistic, we should expect that she is more likely to offer an acceptable 
settlement after a loss than after a victory.  Thus, wars in which the attacker is losing should tend 
to be shorter than if she is winning. 
We also expect that early losses for the attacker are particularly conducive to a short war. 
Compare two wars where both are at the same stage t. Suppose that prior to t each war has the 
same number of wins and losses for A, but that in war 1 the losses occurred early on and in war 2 
the wins occurred early on. If the lowest type of defender still active in each war is the same , 
and assuming that the equilibrium involves only pure strategies, then by Baye’s rule A’s beliefs 
at stage t are the same in each war and the continuations are identical. However, it is likely that 
                                                 
15 The evidence of whether or not wars are duration dependent is mixed.  See Vuchinich 
and Teachman (1993) and Bennett and Stam (1996). 27 
the lowest type still active in war 1 is a stronger type, because early losses make A pessimistic, 
and this makes A more likely to make less demanding proposals – thus, more types of defenders 
accept proposals early on. This contributes to A’s pessimism further, because if the lowest type 
still active at stage t in war 1 is a stronger type then A must be more pessimistic at stage t in war 
1, and as a result is more likely to make a proposal that will be accepted by the strong types. 
Thus, war is likely to end sooner when A sustains early losses. The gamble of making the tough 
demand also seems less risky the lower the anticipated costs of fighting. Unless A risks running 
out of resources, A knows that she can modify her demands when the fighting stops and the 
disputants return to the negotiation table.  The costs of fighting are thus the penalty she must pay 
for attempting to get the better deal initially.  The higher the penalty, the less likely A will want 
to pay it.  The potential reward of gambling with the tougher demand also impacts A’s 
willingness to take the gamble.  The more concessions the weak defender is willing to make, the 
better the return if the gamble actually pays off.  Anticipating a large reward if the gamble pays 
off, A is willing to accept the risk of war. 
The Terms of Settlement 
If and when negotiations do succeed, what are the terms of settlement? To some degree, 
the outcome of a war is unpredictable.  The war began because A did not know for certain which 
defender she faced and thus which terms were acceptable. In addition what D is willing to accept 
depends in part on the history of the war and we cannot anticipate battle outcomes with certainty.  
We can, however, identify the parameters that impact what both types of D are willing to accept 
and thus generally determine how the terms of settlement might vary between conflicts. Result 7 
establishes that D is willing to concede more of the benefits during the negotiations than he 28 
expects he will have to concede in battle. Result 8 identifies the parameters that affect the size of 
the concession D is willing to make (in stages 1 and 2) or accept (in stage 3). 
 Result 7: The minimum amount of  a B in stage 3 that type  h d must obtain in order to not attack 
after A retreats,  a
h B ) 1 ( 3 γ − , is less than the expected amount that type  h d would obtain by 
fighting,  a hB d . Similarly, if A attacks with probability 1 in stage 2 and 
h
2 γ is well defined, then 
the minimum amount of  d B  type  h d  must retain in order to agree,  d
h B ) 1 ( 2 γ − , is less than the 
expected amount that type  h d would retain by fighting,  ) ( a d h B B d + . There is a similar 
relationship in stage 1. Similar relationships hold for type  l d :  a l a
l B d B < − ) 1 ( 3 γ and 
) ( ) 1 ( 2 a d l d
l B B d B + < −γ .  
Proof: Consider the negotiating position of type  h d in stage 3. First note that if  1 3 =
h γ  then the 
result holds because  0 > h d .  If  1 3 <
h γ , then 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ) 1 ( , ( 3 d
ll
d d h d a
lw
d d h d a
h l
d d B R U d B B R U d B B R U − + + = + −γ .  
Note that if type  h d fights she receives benefits  d a B B + with probability  h d and benefits  d B with 
probability  h d − 1 . Given this, her expected amount of benefits is  d a h B B d + . By Jensen’s 
inequality, ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , ( d
l
d d h d a
l
d d h d a h
l
d d B R U d B B R U d B B d R U − + + ≥ + . Given that 
ll
d R and 
lw
d R are both less than 
l
d R , this implies that 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , ( d
ll
d d h d a
lw
d d h d a h
l
d d B R U d B B R U d B B d R U − + + > + .  Because the right-hand side of 
this inequality is equal to  ) ) 1 ( , ( 3 d a
h l
d d B B R U + −γ , this inequality implies that  a h a
h B d B < − ) 1 ( 3 γ . 
A similar argument establishes that  a l a
l B d B < − ) 1 ( 3 γ . The method of proof to establish 29 
) ( ) 1 ( 2 a d h d
h B B d C + < −γ and ) ( ) 1 ( 2 a d l d
l B B d B + < −γ is the same. For brevity we omit the 
details. A similar logic applies to stages 1 and 2 and is omitted for the sake of brevity. QED 
Result 8: The minimum amount of benefits in stage 3 that type  h d must obtain in order to not 
attack after A retreats,  d a
h B B + − ) 1 ( 3 γ , is weakly increasing in  h d ,  a B , and  d B and weakly 
decreasing in D’s anticipated resource losses. Similarly, if A attacks with probability 1 in stage 2, 
then the minimum amount of benefits in stage 2 that type  h d  must retain in order to agree, 
d
h B ) 1 ( 2 γ − , is weakly increasing in  h d ,  a B , and  d B and weakly decreasing in D’s anticipated 
resource losses. There is a similar relationship in stage 1.Similar results hold for type  l d .   








d l R R − = ∆ represent D’s anticipated resource losses. If  1 3 =
h γ , then changes in  h d ,  a B ,  d B , 
w ∆ , and  l ∆ may be inframarginal and have no effect on 
h
3 γ . If  1 3 <
h γ then 
) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ) 1 ( , ( 3 d
ll
d d h d a
lw
d d h d a
l
d d B R U d B B R U d B B R U − + + = + −γ . Partial derivatives can be 
used to show that the right-hand side is increasing in  h d , a B , and  d B  and decreasing in  w ∆  and 
l ∆ . Therefore, as  h d , a B , and d B rise or as  w ∆  and  l ∆ fall,  d a
h B B + − ) 1 ( 3 γ must rise in order to 
maintain the equality. The method of proof to establish the parameter effects on  d
h B ) 1 ( 2 γ − and 
d
h B ) 1 ( 1 γ − is the same. For brevity we omit the details. QED 
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. D’s willingness to make concessions 
at the negotiating table depends on what he believes will happen if negotiations fail and fighting 
continues. The better the diplomats expect the generals to do, the fewer concessions the 
diplomats are willing to make.  Similarly, the more valuable the benefits that may be taken by 
force, the less willing D is to give them up during negotiations. In this game, since the 30 
negotiators’ positions are driven by what they expect to happen if negotiations fail and fighting 
continues, negotiated settlements are not necessarily any “fairer” than military decisions.
16  They 
are, however, more efficient because resources are not needlessly expended during battle. 
Although expectations about future battle losses and victories determine in large part D’s 
position during negotiations, note that D is willing to concede more than that which he expects 
the generals could obtain by force. D’s desire to avoid the costs of fighting as well as his desire 
to avoid the risks of battle ensure that he is more amenable to compromise than his military 
abilities might indicate. Even if D wins future battles, he must expend resources. Since he values 
his resources as well as his benefits, he is willing to give up some of his expected benefits in 
order to avoid the costs of fighting.  The greater the anticipated costs, the more D is willing to 
compromise.  The risks inherent to war also encourage D to accept less at the negotiating table 
than he expects to gain from fighting. A risk-averse defender is willing to compromise on the 
settlement in order to avoid the uncertainty associated with a military decision. While the costs 
and risks of war are often identified as a deterrent to fighting, more specifically the anticipated 
costs of and the risks associated with war help the disputants to avoid war by making the 
disputants more willing to compromise during negotiations.  
Simulation Results 
The above discussion describes the model’s comparative statics for a relatively simple 
case. In this section, we explore the model further using simulation methods. Assumptions 1-3 
made above are abandoned: the simulation program puts no constraints on the maximum number 
of battles or the number of types. Once war starts, if A continues to attack and D does not accept 
                                                 
16 This perspective on negotiated settlements differs from the view often espoused about 
the benefits of negotiated settlements over military victories (see Werner 1999 for a review).  31 
any proposal then war over  d B continues.  If A retreats and D refuses her proposal, then war over 
a B occurs. War continues until one player gives up or no one is willing to attack. Assume that a 
player with no resources cannot attack or defend, so the war cannot last longer than it takes for 
one of the players to run out of resources. The war typically ends sooner because D agrees to one 
of A’s proposals.  
The simulation results demonstrate that the model accommodates a wide variety of 
patterns depending on the size of the benefits, the initial resources of each side, the resource 
losses that are anticipated to occur in each battle, the military ability of each type, and the degree 
to which A is optimistic about D’s type. The results show that the model can generate equilibria 
with no war and the preservation of the status quo, war with several battles, an instant settlement, 
a battle followed by a settlement, or a battle followed by a retreat and a return to the status quo.  
In all of the results presented here the following utility functions are used: 
) 1 ( ) ( ) , (
a a B R B R U a a
α α β
− + =  
) 1 ( ) ( ) , (
d d B R B R U d d
α α β
− + = , 
where 1 . 0 = a α , 1 . 0 = d α , 5 . 0 = a β , and  5 . 0 = d β . 
We start from a base case with the following parameters:  20 = a B , 20 = d B , 5 = a R , and 
5 = d R . Each victory costs a player one unit of resources and each loss costs the player one and a 
half units of resources, so  4 =
w
a R , 5 . 3 =
l
a R , 3 =
ww
a R , 5 . 2 =
wl
a R , etc. In the base case there are 
five types of D: 
} 60 . 55 ,. 50 ,. 45 ,. 40 {. } , , , , { 5 4 3 2 1 = d d d d d . 
















{ } , , , , { 5 4 3 2 1 = λ λ λ λ λ . 
Note in the base case both players have benefits of the same size and the same level of 
resources, and if A fought a battle with the average defender then A would win with probability 
.5.  In the base case in equilibrium A does not ask for  d B in stage 1 so war never starts. In what 
follows, we consider the effects of changing the parameters on the equilibrium. The outcomes of 
conflict are to some extent random simply because battle outcomes are random, and this implies 
that the same initial underlying conditions can lead to a variety of outcomes. We describe all of 
the possible outcomes in each case. 
First consider what happens if  2 = a B while all of the other parameters take their base-
case values. This represents the case in which the two players are evenly matched in terms of 
resources but the attacker has fewer benefits. In this case in equilibrium A proposes 
} 37 ,. 63 . { d d a B B B + . The only type that accepts this proposal is type  1 d . The others refuse, and 
after a refusal A attacks.  If A wins the first battle, she proposes  } 27 ,. 73 . { d d a B B B + and all types 
accept except type  5 d .  After a refusal, which occurs only if D is type  5 d , A attacks again. If she 
wins the second battle she proposes  } 0 , { d a B B + and D accepts. If A loses the first battle she 
proposes } 76 ,. 24 . { d d a B B B + and all types accept except type  5 d . After a refusal, A attacks. If A 
wins the second battle she proposes  } 54 ,. 46 . { d d a B B B + and D accepts. If A loses the second 
battle, she retreats and proposes the status quo  } , { d a B B and D accepts. 
Interestingly, for a considerable range of benefit values, scaling the benefits upward 
while keeping the distribution at a 1:10 ratio leads to the same strategies as in this case. Scaling 
the benefits downward leads to the same strategies for some range, but once the benefits become 33 
small enough the equilibrium changes.  For example, when  01 . = a B and 10 . = d B , in stage 1 A 
proposes } 57 ,. 43 . { d d a B B B + and all types accept. 
Case 1 establishes that an imbalance of benefits when the distribution of power is 
perceived to be equal leads to redistribution. If the stakes are relatively small then an agreement 
occurs without a war, but if the stakes are high then a fight is more likely to occur. Note that if 
war starts then the battle outcomes influence subsequent proposals. If A wins the proposals 
become more demanding and if A loses the proposals become less demanding. Two early losses 
lead to retreat and the restoration of the status quo. This does not occur because D is no longer 
capable of fighting – it occurs because D is unwilling to risk resources to obtain A’s small 
benefits. 
Now consider what happens if the benefits are equal but A is stronger than D. If A has 
more resources than D she can last longer if they fight. Suppose that  7 = a R and all other 
parameters take on their base-case values. In this case, in stage 1 A proposes } 32 ,. 68 . { d d a B B B + . 
Types  1 d ,  2 d , and  3 d  agree and the others refuse. After a refusal A attacks. If A wins the first 
battle she proposes  } 15 ,. 85 . { d d a B B B + and both remaining types accept. If A loses the first battle, 
she proposes  } 53 ,. 47 . { d d a B B B + and both remaining types accept. Increasing A’s initial 
resources more makes the conflict even more one-sided – if  10 = a R and all the other parameters 
take on their base-case values then in stage 1 A proposes the re-division  } 0 , { d a B B + and all types 
agree. 
In the second instance, the disputants’ benefits and resources are equal but A is more 
optimistic about D’s type and thus expects that she has a greater than equal chance of winning 34 















{ } , , , , { 5 4 3 2 1 = λ λ λ λ λ . In equilibrium in stage 1 A proposes 
} 75 ,. 25 . { d d a B B B + . Type  1 d accepts and the others refuse. After a refusal A attacks. If A wins 
the first battle she proposes  } 65 ,. 35 . { d d a B B B + . Type  2 d accepts and the others refuse. After a 
refusal A attacks. If A loses the second battle, she retreats and proposes the status quo, which all 
types accept. If A wins the second battle she proposes  } 48 ,. 52 . { d d a B B B + . Types  3 d and 
4 d accept and type  5 d refuses. After a refusal A attacks again. If A wins the third battle, she 
proposes } 0 , { d a B B + and D agrees. If A loses the third battle she retreats and proposes the status 
quo, which D accepts. If A loses the first battle, she retreats and proposes  } 09 ,. 91 {. d a a B B B + . 
Type  2 d agrees but the others refuse and attack. If A wins the second battle she proposes the 
status quo and D accepts. If A loses the second battle she proposes  } 39 ,. 61 {. d a a B B B + and D 
accepts. In this instance, the war endures when A severely miscalculates her opponent. The war 
can last because A was initially confident that she was facing a weak defender but was in fact 
confronting a much stronger defender. While A learns from D’s refusal and from her battle 
losses, her initial optimism ensures that the learning process is slower than if she was not so 
confident originally. 
These last cases demonstrate that a perceived imbalance of power when the benefits are 
balanced leads to re-distribution.  A always makes a demand in this instance. Whether or not a 
war follows and how long the war lasts depends on much the defender believes she must 
concede, if anything.  The stronger the defender actually is, the more likely a war will start and 
the less likely the war will end quickly. Together these cases provide important evidence that a 
perceived disparity between the distributions of power and benefits coupled with some 
uncertainty about how large that disparity might be is a potent source of conflict.  35 
Conclusion 
This model, although already fairly complex, should be viewed as only a starting point to 
understand the process of war onset and war termination. There are many factors that likely 
impact how the disputants’ negotiate and fight that are not included in this model.  Most notably, 
the model is devoid of any domestic political considerations.  In this model, we assume that the 
attacker can effortlessly revise upward or downward her demands.  Similarly we assume that the 
benefits at stake are completely divisible.  A leader responsive to domestic political concerns, 
however, is likely much less flexible. We also make fairly simple assumptions about each side’s 
probability of victory in battle.  In reality, the disputants’ probability of success is likely affected 
by what happens on the battlefield and by what military strategies they choose. Further, we have 
not included in this model the potential for third parties to intervene.  The anticipation of third-
party intervention not only influences the disputants’ strategies but also impacts their probability 
of success in the case of intervention. We do not deny the importance of these areas and intend to 
include such considerations into the model in the near future.  We offer this model as a base case 
from which we can measure the impact of these other factors.  
Despite its simplicity, we contend that this model makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of international conflict because it provides a unified theory of war onset and war 
termination.  The equilibrium specify not only if a war starts, but when it ends, and the terms on 
which it terminates.  Since the duration and the terms of the war depend on which defender the 
attacker actually faces (and that fact is unknown) and on the battle history, the duration of the 
war and the terms of settlement are to some degree unpredictable.  We have provided, however, 
several results that increase our ability to anticipate the onset, termination, and outcome of 
international conflict.   36 
The model also provides a general explanation for why wars start and how they end. In 
the model a war starts because 1. The attacker believes her power affords her a greater share of 
the benefits than she currently has and thus demands some concessions from the defender and 2. 
The defender believes that she does not need to make as many concessions as the attacker has 
demanded and thus refuses to concede. The war continues so long as the attacker continues to 
overestimate what the defender will concede or, in the event of a retreat, to underestimate what 
she must give up. The war ends when the attacker’s and the defender’s beliefs about the 
defender’s power converge sufficiently for the attacker to make a proposal acceptable to the 
defender.  
The model suggests that the war itself is the mechanism by which this convergence 
occurs.  Ironically, war lays the path to peace (Wagner 1993). If the disputants initially are 
uncertain about each other’s abilities, then the opponent’s continued willingness to fight as well 
as the progress on the battlefield provides considerable information about such questions.  As the 
belligerents learn about each other through the war, negotiations become more productive as 
each recognizes the demands they can make or must concede to. In this depiction of war, the 
military is no longer an alternative to diplomacy, but instead an extension of it; the disputants 
fight in order to support rather than to supplant their negotiating position.   37 
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